This paper tests for the capitalization of policy platforms into equity prices using a sample of 70 firms favored under Bush or Gore platforms during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. Two sources of daily data during the six months leading up to the election are incorporated: firm-specific equity returns and the probability of a Bush victory as implied by prices from the Iowa electronic market.
Introduction
On the day following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that guaranteed a victory for George Bush in the 2000 Presidential Election, several media reports noted the increase in prices of equities favored under Bush's campaign platforms. 1 Among these so-called Bush stocks, Pfizer rose 4.1 percent, Exxon rose 1.3 percent, and Philip Morris rose 6.5 percent. While this anecdotal evidence is suggestive of the capitalization of campaign platforms into equity prices, other Bush stocks, such as Microsoft, fell in value on that day. Moreover, it is difficult to separate the reaction of equity prices to this political event from other economic and financial developments.
A final complication of interpretation involves investor expectations; in particular, these returns can only be interpreted as a lower bound on the total value of favorable policies to these firms given that markets may have largely factored in a Bush victory prior to the Supreme Court's ruling.
Using evidence from the period preceding the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, this paper attempts to overcome these complications in a test for the capitalization of public policies into equity prices using evidence from a sample of 70 firms favored under either Bush (41 firms)
or Gore (29 firms) policy platforms. Two sources of daily data are incorporated: private equity returns and candidate electoral prospects as implied by prices of political future contracts from the Iowa Electronic Market. The daily baseline estimates provide strong evidence that platforms are capitalized into equity prices: under the Bush administration, relative to a counterfactual Gore administration, Bush-favored firms are worth 3 percent more and Gorefavored firms are worth 6 percent less. The most sensitive sectors include tobacco, worth 13 percent more under a favorable Bush administration, Microsoft competitors, worth 15 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration, and alternative energy companies, worth 16 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration. A corresponding analysis of campaign contributions, which allows for heterogeneity in the importance of policy platforms to these firms, supports the baseline estimates. These results are then compared with results from a more traditional event study based upon the Florida recount.
These results provide evidence for the existence of election-contingent security markets, 1 See, for example, The New York Times, December 14, 2000. as hypothesized by Musto and Yilmaz (2003) ; the authors demonstrate that, if such markets exist, consumers will purchase these securities as a hedge against wealth risk induced by differing candidate platforms over redistribution. In equilibrium, wealth considerations have no effect on voting but redistribution is the same regardless of the outcome of the election. In the context of the 2000 election, wealthy individuals could have purchased Gore-favored equities as a hedge against a loss by Bush, who proposed to significantly reduce federal income tax rates at the top end of the wealth and income distribution. Of course, this evidence does not prove that voters adopted such strategies but rather merely provides evidence on the feasibility of such strategies.
Related empirical literature
Several studies have tested for the capitalization of federal tax policies into equity prices by studying the response of equity prices to political developments during negotiations over tax legislation. Cutler (1988) , in a study of the stock market's reaction to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, finds that the legislation's differential treatment of old and new capital is reflected in equity returns. However, the author finds no evidence of an overall market response to the passage of this legislation, suggesting that the news was not efficiently incorporated into equity prices. Lang and Shackelford (2000) find that stock prices moved inversely with dividend yields following a 1997 budget accord that reduced capital gains tax rates; this finding is consistent with the capitalization of capital gains taxes into equity prices. Sinai and Gyourko (2003) use the same natural experiment in a study of corporate-level investment subsidies and also conclude that the tax changes were capitalized into equity prices.
A related literature studies the effects of broader political events, such as elections and changes in the ruling party, on equity prices. Using evidence from the Iowa Electronic Market, Slemrod and Greimel (1999) demonstrate that the flat tax proposal put forth by candidate Steve Forbes during the 1996 Presidential primaries had predictable effects on the U.S. municipal bond market. Fisman's (2001) study of Indonesia reports that equity prices of firms closely connected to President Suharato experienced large declines, relative to prices of lesser-connected firms, in reaction to news of Suharato's deteriorating health. One limitation of this study is that none of these health episodes forced Suharato from office, and one must thus interpret these results as a lower bound on the value of political connections. 2 Jayachandran (2002) studies the case of Senator James Jefford's party switch, which ended the Republican control of the U.S.
Senate in 2001. She finds that firms that made campaign contributions to Republicans during the 2000 election cycle declined in value, although no corresponding increase was detected for firms that contributed to the Democratic party. Regarding the magnitude, the defection of Jeffords caused firms to lose or gain 0.8 percent of their market value in aggregate. A closely related study to my paper is Herron et. al (1999) , who use measures of candidate electoral prospects based upon the Iowa electronic market during the 1992 Presidential election. While using similar sources of variation, there are several differences between Herron et al. and my paper. Most importantly, in their analysis of 74 economic sectors, the main focus of the paper, they attempt to measure sector-specific political sensitivity by regressing rates of return in equity markets on changes in electoral prospects separately for each of the sectors. 3 My study, by contrast, incorporates independent information on firms favored under Bush and Gore campaign platforms and uses this information to uncover the significance of these platforms.
Note that this type of independent information is required in order to provide evidence for the existence of election-contingent securities as hypothesized in Musto and Yilmaz (2003) .
In a theoretically-focused paper of which I became aware after writing the first draft of my paper, Mattozzi (2003) independently constructs an index of equity prices for firms making significant campaign contributions to Bush and Gore; he finds that Bush stocks rose in value as the probability of a Bush victory increases, as implied by the Iowa Electronic Market, while firms contributing to Gore experienced corresponding decreases. 2 Fisman does attempt to quantify the value of political connections by using the return on the Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index as a measure of the severity of the rumor. Based upon responses of investment bankers in Indonesia to the question "how much would the Index had dropped if Suharto had died suddenly?", the author attempts to estimate the value of political connections. While suggestive, this exercise rests on the subjective views of investment bankers and, as the author notes, involves an inference that is quite far out of sample. 3 In a separate analysis, which is not the main focus of their paper, they do incorporate information from a Hussein is ousted by a certain date. They conclude that a war raises oil prices $10 per barrel and lowers the value of U.S. equities 15 percent.
While this paper focuses on the electoral-induced redistribution of resources across industries, a much larger literature examines the aggregate macroeconomic implications of elections.
With forward-looking voters, uncertain election outcomes, and Democrats, relative to Republicans, preferring higher inflation rates in return for lower unemployment rates, the resolution of electoral outcomes has macroeconomic implications. In particular, Democratic administrations should be associated with decreases in unemployment rates and increases in inflation rates, while the reverse should hold for Republican administrations. 4 Historical evidence from the U.S. generally supports these predictions; see Mueller (2003) for further information.
3 Sources of Daily Data
Probability of Bush victory
The first data source provides information on the relative electoral prospects of the two candi- data on equities from financial markets.
As shown in Figure 1 , the Iowa Electronic Market data demonstrate that the 2000 race was extremely close throughout the six months preceding the election, with Gore taking the lead following the Republican National Convention (labeled RNC) and the Democratic National Convention (labeled DNC), both held in August, before Bush pulled ahead during the three Presidential debates (labeled D1, D2, and D3), which were held during October. Bush extended this lead in early November, and, by November 6, the eve of the election and final day of the sample, the implied probability of a Bush victory had risen to just over 75 percent.
While contracts based upon the electoral college, rather than the popular vote, would be preferable, I believe that the ex-post divergence between electoral college and popular vote outcomes in the 2000 election was largely unexpected and thus electoral college contract prices would have been similar to those of the popular vote contracts. Such divergences are historically rare; the previous divergence occurred in 1888. In the 2000 election, neither candidate had a significant ex-ante electoral college advantage. Analysts expected, if anything, Gore to have a slight electoral college advantage. 5 For several reasons, the Iowa Electronic Market data are preferred to tracking poll data.
First, the latter data provide expected vote shares while the former data provide probabilities of victory. Such probabilities, as will be shown below, are required in order to quantify the value of favorable policies. 6 The second advantage of the Iowa Electronic Market data involves efficiency. According to an analysis of 15 elections, the market worked extremely well, dominating opinion polls on average in forecasting the outcome of the election (Berg et al, 2000) . 7 Even given these limitations associated with polling data, Figure 2 demonstrates that Gallup tracking poll data, which are available on a daily basis beginning September 7, 2000 , move in tandem with prices from the Iowa Electronic Market. As shown in Table 1 price demonstrates that this relationship is statistically significant, and this result is robust to a specification in first differences.
Equity Returns
Equity prices are taken from the Dow Jones Interactive Service and are adjusted for dividends and stock splits. To account for broader trends in equity markets during the sample period, I
follow event study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997) and use abnormal returns in the analysis. In order to calculate these abnormal returns, I first estimate the following market model:
where r it is the daily rate of return of firm i on day t. As a measure of broad market returns 
These abnormal returns are then used in the empirical analysis below. While these 70 firms represent a small fraction of the roughly 6000 publicly traded firms in the United States, these are some of the largest firms. As of May 1, 2000, the first day of the sample period, the aggregate market capitalization of these 70 firms totaled almost $3 trillion, representing almost one-fifth of the $16 trillion market capitalization of the Wilshire 5000, which includes nearly all publicly traded equities.
Analysis of campaign platforms
As shown in Figure 3 , the probability of Bush victory is positively correlated with the log difference between Bush and Gore equity prices, especially in the three months preceding the election, suggesting that policy platforms matter for firm profitability. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, equity market returns appear to be a leading indicator of the price of a Bush contract in the Iowa Electronic Market. The empirical analysis below will attempt to address this issue by estimating specifications that include both leads and lags of the probability of a Bush victory.
Empirical Model
Consider the following empirical model of firm i's rate of return at time t:
where Bush-favored i indicates whether the firm is favored under the Bush platform, ∆ Pr(Bush) t indicates the daily change in the probability of a Bush victory, u it captures unobserved factors affecting returns, and α i , β 1 , and β 2 represent parameters to be estimated. The fixed effects (α i ) allow for firm-specific trends in equity prices during the sample period, while β 1 and β 2 are the key parameters in the test for capitalization; these parameters can be interpreted as follows:
Thus, the parameter β 1 can be interpreted as the percentage difference in a Bush-favored firm's market value under a Bush administration, relative to a counterfactual Gore administration, while β 2 captures a similar percentage difference for Gore-favored firms. The capitalization hypothesis predicts β 1 > 0 and β 2 < 0.
Baseline Results
As shown in column 1 of Table 3 , the preliminary results demonstrate that, for this group of politically-sensitive firms, campaign platforms matter for firm profitability, and this relationship is both economically and statistically significant. Gore-favored firms are worth 6 percent less under a Bush administration, relative to a friendlier Gore administration. Bush-favored firms, by contrast, are worth 3 percent more under a friendlier Bush Administration. In monetary terms, Bush's victory over Gore transferred over $100 billion in market capitalization from the 29 Gore-favored firms to the 41 Bush-favored firms. 8 The differential return (
as shown at the bottom of Table 3 , is 9 percent and is statistically significant at conventional levels; this statistic provides a somewhat weaker test of the capitalization hypothesis and is more consistent with the evidence in Figure 3 , which depicts returns for Bush-favored equities relative to Gore-favored equities.
As shown, the political measures have limited explanatory power as the R-squared is only 0.0196. While each of the 133 events has only limited explanatory power, this limitation must be balanced against two benefits. First, as noted above, event studies in the existing literature often measure only a lower bound on the value of favorable policies, while, by utilizing probability-based measures, my study provides a point estimate. Second, the large number of events provides additional statistical power. The relative strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches will be examined in more detail in Section 6, which, for comparison purposes, provides a companion event study based upon the Florida recount.
As was shown in Figure 3 , daily movements in stock prices and candidate electoral prospects tend to exhibit high levels of variance. In an attempt to smooth through some of this daily variance, column 2 of Table 3 presents estimates using weekly data (Friday close to Friday close). As shown, the R-squared rises significantly from 0.02 to 0.13, and the estimated value of favorable policies for Gore-favored firms rises substantially from 6 to 12 percent, and this result is statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated value of favorable policies for Bush-favored firms also rises from 3 to 4 percent, although this result is statistically insignificant, perhaps reflecting the loss in power from the reduced sample size. The differential return also rises from 9 to 16 percent, a statistically significant result.
Robustness Checks
As a first robustness check, Table 4 The high volume (at least 229 trades in Bush contracts) sample, unlike the low volume (less than 229 trades in Bush contracts) sample, supports a statistically significant estimated value of favorable policies for Gore-favored firms. For Bush-favored firms, by contrast, the result is statistically insignificant in the high-volume sample but significant in the low-volume sample.
As an additional robustness check, Table 5 presents the coefficients on the contemporaneous change in the probability of a Bush victory after controlling leads and lags in the change in the probability of a Bush victory. As shown in column 1, after controlling for 4 lags in the change in the probability of a Bush victory (coefficients not reported), the contemporaneous results are similar to those in the baseline results of Table 3 . Incorporating a one-week lag into the weekly specification (column 2) again produces results similar to those in the baseline analysis.
Columns 3 and 4 present results incorporating leads of changes in the probability of a Bush victory. Again, the coefficients on the contemporaneous change in the probability of a Bush victory are similar to those in the baseline analysis.
Sector Analysis
The above analysis incorporated the implicit assumption that policy platforms were equally important to all firms in the sample. This section relaxes that assumption in a sector-bysector analysis. As shown in column 1 of Table 6 , three out of the five sectors demonstrate statistically significant results using daily data. Alternative energy companies, which were favored under Gore's energy platforms, are worth 16 percent less under Bush, while conventional energy companies appear to be politically insensitive. Microsoft competitors are worth 15 percent more under a Bush administration; no relationship is detected for Microsoft itself, perhaps reflecting the sample size of a single firm. Finally, tobacco firms are worth 13 percent more under Bush, relative to Gore, who favored FDA regulation of nicotine as an addictive drug. Column 2 presents results using weekly data. As shown, only one sector, Gore-favored pharmaceuticals, is statistically significant, perhaps reflecting the loss in statistical power from the reduced sample size.
Campaign contribution analysis
I next provide an analysis of campaign contributions for this group of 70 politically sensitive firms. During the 2000 campaign, corporations made both hard money contributions to candidates, through their political action committees (PACs), and soft money contributions directly from their treasuries to political parties. In the results presented below, I simply sum together hard and soft money contributions. 9 The remainder of this section describes in more detail data on hard and soft money campaign contributions.
Hard money contributions
During the 2000 election cycle, corporate PACs were permitted to contribute up to $10,000 to a given candidate. According to data from the Center For Responsive Politics (CRP), 17 out of these 70 firms had political action committees that donated to the Bush campaign during the 2000 election cycle. As shown in Table 7 , the average contribution across all firms was around $1,000 with Bush-favored firms contributing slightly more. The Gore campaign, by contrast, did not accept contributions from corporate political action committees.
Soft money contributions
While hard money contributions were capped at $10,000 per candidate during the 2000 election cycle, corporations could make unlimited soft money contributions directly to political parties, and these contributions have played an increasingly important role in recent Presidential elections. 10 As shown in Table 7 , contributions, as measured by the CRP, from these firms to the RNC exceeded contributions to the DNC, and this effect is particularly noticeable among Bush-favored firms. Gore-favored firms, by contrast, gave similar amounts on average to the RNC and DNC. 9 I have also estimated specifications that allow the coefficient to vary across hard and soft money contributions.
The results were strongest for soft money contributions, an unsurprising result given their large magnitude, relative to hard money contributions, as shown in Table 7 . 10 According to an analysis of political television advertisements in the 75 largest markets in the United States While political parties are restricted by law from sponsoring "express advocacy" advertisements, those designed to promote specific candidates, they may sponsor "issue advocacy"
advertisements. In principle, issue advocacy is designed to promote specific policies but, in practice, such advertisements can promote specific candidates. 11 As shown in Appendix B, the text of two "issue advocacy" advertisements from the 2000 campaign clearly demonstrates that advertisements sponsored by political parties can promote specific candidates.
The primary drawback of using soft money contributions to political parties is that not all contributions to political parties were used to promote the two Presidential candidates. To address, at least in part, this data limitation, I exclude those contributions to parties designed to explicitly fund Congressional candidates. 12 
Empirical Model
where C Bush i and C Gore i represent firm i's campaign contribution to the two candidates and V it−1 represents yesterday's market capitalization and scales campaign contributions according to firm size. Multiplying both sides of this expression by V it−1 and noting that r it = (V it −V it−1 )/V it−1 , one can derive the following expressions:
11 Advertisements are considered issue advocacy so long as they do not contain what have become known as magic words, which include "vote for", "vote against", "support" or "defeat". 12 More specifically, I include only contributions from corporations to the Democratic National Committee One caveat of this analysis involves motives for contributing to candidates. In particular, this analysis cannot distinguish between the two motives identified by Grossman and Helpman (1996): electoral motives (contributing in order to alter election outcomes) and influence motives (contributing in order to influence campaign platforms). The latter motive would be associated with a causal interpretation of campaign contributions, while, under the former motive, firms contribute to candidates with platforms favorable to their business interests, and the relationship is not necessarily causal. Under either motive, however, campaign contributions are positively correlated with the benefits of favorable policy platforms. Campaign contributions can thus be considered an alternative measure of the benefits firms receive from policy platforms. These contributions, although a less direct measure of policy platforms than that used in the baseline analysis, are a continuous measure and thus allow for heterogeneity in political sensitivity across firms.
As shown in column 1 of Table 8 , contributions to Gore, conditional on contributions to Bush, are associated with a reduction in market value under a Bush administration in a statistically and economically significant manner. Conversely, contributions to Bush are associated with a significant increase in market value under a Bush administration. The weekly results, as shown in column 2, are statistically insignificant, perhaps reflecting the loss in power associated with the reduced sample size.
Florida recount analysis
This section provides a companion event study based upon the Florida recount. This analysis serves two purposes. First, it provides a cross validation of the baseline results, which used probabilities of candidate electoral success as implied by prices from the Iowa electronic market.
Second, it allows for a comparison with event studies in the existing literature by highlighting the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.
Following the November 7 election, the state of Florida, which was pivotal in the electoral For the purposes of this analysis, the Florida recount is considered as a single event, which is assumed to begin on November 8, the day after the election, and to end on December 14, the day following Gore's concession, which occurred after the close of markets on December 13. 13 Using the sample of 70 firms described in the baseline analysis above, a policy platform-based model, given below, is estimated:
As shown in Table 9 , rates of returns for Bush-favored firms exceeded those of Gore-favored firms by about 4 percent, although this result is statistically insignificant. Regarding the magnitude, this estimate of the value of favorable policy platforms is smaller than are those in the baseline estimates, suggesting that markets had already factored in a Bush victory.
In addition, an event study using campaign contributions to the candidates is provided.
The following model is estimated: 13 Of course, one could analyze legal and developments during the recount as separate events. Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify days which were favorable for Gore. The most promising announcement for Gore, the Friday, December 8 order for further recounts, was issued after the close of equity markets, and the U.S. Supreme
Court halted further recounting before markets opened again on Monday, December 11.
As shown in the second column of 
A.4 Microsoft Case
While Gore has broken ranks with the president on several recent occasions, he and President
Clinton have remained quiet on Microsoft. In November, at Microsoft headquarters, Gore said stern antitrust action sometimes is needed to break up "unhealthy concentrations of power" that snuffs out competition. Gore stressed, however, that he was speaking only of his belief in the "fundamental American value" of making sure that neither heavy-handed government for unfair business practices quash competition.
Source: Associated Press Apr 9, 2000
The government won the first round of the antitrust case against Microsoft, but with years of legal appeals anticipated, who the new president is could change how the case is resolved.
Bush has signaled he would be more friendly to the company.
A law professor said, "Could the outcome of the election have an impact on the case? Yes.
But less because of control over the Justice Dept. and more because of control over the Supreme Court." Judge Jackson could send the case directly to the Supreme Court.
Source: Associated Press Apr 9, 2000
A.5 Tobacco
There is no greater threat to the health and safety of our children than tobacco. Tobacco hooks 3,000 teens every day, and more than 1,000 will die from it. If our children don't start smoking by the time they turn 19, they're unlikely to start at all. The President's antitobacco plan will reduce teen smoking by 42% over the next five years. I call on Congress to pass comprehensive, bipartisan anti-tobacco legislation -and to do it now.
Source: Al Gore speech to National PTA, Jun 14, 1999 Gore said Congress should give the FDA power to regulate nicotine as an addictive drug. Narrator: "They say oil and water don't mix. Nowhere is that more true than in Texas. Table 3 Capitalization of Policy Platforms: Baseline Estimates
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level
The coefficient reported in the specification with lags is the cumulative effect of change in Pr(Bush).
(1) Table 8 Campaign Contribution Analysis
(1) Table 9 
